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Security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) typically assume that the devices of the legitimate users
are perfectly shielded from the eavesdropper. This assumption is, however, very hard to meet in practice, and
thus the security of current QKD implementations is not guaranteed. Here, we fill this gap by providing a finite-
key security analysis for QKD which is valid against arbitrary information leakage from the state preparation
process of the legitimate users. For this, we extend the techniques introduced in [1] to the finite-key regime,
and we evaluate the security of a leaky decoy-state BB84 protocol with biased basis choice, which is one of the
most implemented QKD schemes today. Our simulation results demonstrate the practicability of QKD over long
distances and within a reasonable time frame given that the legitimate users’ devices are sufficiently isolated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [2] is undoubtedly the
principal application of quantum cryptography nowadays,
as in theory it can offer information-theoretic secure
communications [3, 4]. Unfortunately, however, real-
life implementations of QKD do not typically fulfill the
assumptions which are made in the security proofs and
thus their security cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, one key
assumption in most security proofs of QKD is that the devices
of the legitimate users (commonly known as Alice and Bob)
are perfectly isolated from the eavesdropper (Eve), which
means that they do not leak any unwanted information to a
channel. This strong assumption is, however, very difficult (if
not impossible) to assure in practice. For instance, Eve could
perform a so-called Trojan-horse attack (THA) [5, 6] against
Alice and/or Bob’s devices to obtain side-channel information
about their internal settings for each transmitted signal. For
example, Eve could try to learn, say, the basis information
and the intensity setting used by Alice to generate each of her
signals in a decoy-state based QKD protocol. For this, Eve
could inject bright light pulses into Alice’s transmitter and
then measure the back-reflected light to extract information
about Alice’s state preparation process. This situation is
illustrated in Fig. 1. Also, Eve might obtain information
about the internal functioning of Alice and Bob’s devices by
passively monitoring, for instance, their power consumption
or electromagnetic radiation.
This problem has been analysed recently in [1, 7]. More
precisely, the authors of [7] evaluated the security of a
QKD system in the presence of information leakage from
Alice’s phase modulator (PM), which is used to encode the
bit and basis information of the generated signals. A key
observation here is that, in this scenario, the joint state of
Alice’s transmitted signals and Eve’s back-reflected light from
her THA is not basis-independent but it depends on Alice’s
basis choice. This means that the security of the system can
be analysed using the techniques introduced in [8]. More
recently, these seminal results have been generalised, and a
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formalism to prove the security of decoy-state QKD [9–11]
in the presence of arbitrary information leakage from both
the PM and the intensity modulator (IM), which is used to
select the intensity setting for each emitted signal, has been
introduced [1]. In so doing, it is now possible to quantify the
amount of device isolation that is needed to achieve a certain
performance (i.e., a certain secret key rate at a given distance)
with a realistic leaky QKD system.
While the results in [1, 7] constitute an important step
toward guaranteeing the security of quantum communication
systems in the presence of information leakage, both analyses
consider the asymptotic scenario where Alice sends Bob an
infinite number of light pulses. This means that these results
cannot be directly applied to real-life QKD implementations,
where Alice sends Bob only a finite number of signals and
they distill finite-length keys [12–16]. In this work, we fill
this gap and we extend the general framework introduced
in [1] to the finite-key scenario. For this, we present a finite-
key parameter estimation method which can be applied in
the presence of information leakage. In particular, and for
concreteness, we consider a biased basis choice decoy-state
QKD protocol [17, 18] with three-intensity settings. This is
one of the most implemented QKD schemes today [19–25].
Note, however, that our results could be straightforwardly
adapted as well to analyze the security of other decoy-state
based QKD systems.
In addition, we shall consider information leakage from
both the IM and the PM of Alice’s transmitter. The former
implies that a key assumption of the decoy-state method
is violated, as now the yield of an n-photon signal could
depend on the intensity setting used by Alice to generate
it. As a result, we have that the security analysis cannot
be based on the typical counterfactual scenario where the
intensity setting for each transmitted signal is selected by
Alice a posteriori, that is, after Bob has already detected
all the incoming signals. To solve this problem, we use the
trace distance argument introduced in [1], which relates the n-
photon yields (as well as the error rates) associated to pulses
generated with different intensity settings, in combination
with Azuma’s inequality [26]. This inequality allows us
to tackle statistical fluctuations in a finite-key regime while
guaranteeing security against general attacks. To include the
effect of information leakage from the PM in the security
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2analysis, we apply the quantum coin idea introduced in [27,
28] to the finite key regime. For this, we modify slightly
the classical post-processing steps of the QKD protocol such
that the security proof can go through. More precisely, we
now include a random data post-selection step before the
sifting step (see Sec. II). This way, we can quantify the
amount of device isolation which is required to provide a
certain performance, as a function of the total number of
signals transmitted. As expected, the amount of isolation is
inversely proportional to the number of signals transmitted.
That is, for a certain intensity of Eve’s back-reflected light,
the resulting performance of the QKD system improves when
Alice transmits more signals (i.e., when the post-processing
data block sizes increase).
The paper is organised as follows. In Sec. II, we provide
a brief summary of the assumptions made in the security
analysis and describe the decoy-state BB84 protocol that we
consider in our security analysis. Then, in Sec. III we present
a finite-key parameter estimation method to determine, in the
presence of information leakage from both the IM and the
PM, the parameters which are needed to evaluate the secret
key rate formula. Next, for illustration purpose, in Sec. IV
we consider three particular examples of THAs, and we
evaluate the resulting secure secret key rate as a function of the
isolation of the legitimate users’ devices and the total number
of signals transmitted. Finally, in Sec. V we summarise
what has been achieved. Also, the paper contains a few
appendices which contain a summary of the notation used in
this paper, as well as the calculations that we use to derive
the results presented in the main text, together with some
additional simulation results which provide further insights
into the effect of information leakage in a finite-key scenario.
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND DECOY-STATE BB84 PROTOCOL
In the standard BB84 protocol with practical light sources
emitting phase-randomized weak coherent pulses (WCPs),
the so-called photon-number-splitting attack [29, 30] allows
Eve to obtain full information about the part of the key
generated from the multi-photon pulses without inducing any
disturbance in the signal transmission. Decoy-state QKD [9–
11] has been proposed to protect QKD schemes against this
attack. In a typical implementation of the decoy-state BB84
QKD scheme with phase-randomized WCPs, Alice sends Bob
mixtures of Fock states with different mean photon numbers,
which can be described as
ργ
j
=
∞∑
n=0
pjn |n〉 〈n| , (1)
where pjn =
(
γj
)n
e−γ
j
/n! is the probability that the optical
pulse sent by Alice contains n photons given that she selects
the intensity γj , and |n〉 denotes a Fock state with n photons.
A key assumption of the decoy-state method is that both
the yield and the error rate of an n-photon state, |n〉, are
independent of the intensity setting selected by Alice. Here,
the yield of |n〉 refers to the conditional probability of
observing a detection event at Bob’s measurement device
given that Alice sends him such a state. The independence of
the yields on the intensity setting selected by Alice arises from
the fact that given an n-photon state, Eve cannot determine
with certainty the intensity setting with which the state was
generated, as |n〉 does not contain any information about
the intensity setting. However, as pointed out in [1], this
assumption is no longer true in the presence of information
leakage from the source. Since in such a scenario the state
Alice sends is not in a single mode anymore, Eve might obtain
partial information about Alice’s intensity setting choice. This
latter situation is discussed in more detail in Sec. III.
Although, in general, Alice can use an arbitrary number of
intensity settings to prepare her decoy states in the protocol,
for simplicity and without loss of generality, in this work we
shall consider, just as an example, a three-intensity decoy-
state BB84 protocol with a biased basis choice [17, 18], which
is the most implemented solution for long-distance QKD
experiments [19–25]. In addition, we shall assume that Alice
and Bob distill a secret key only from those events where both
of them select the Z basis and Alice selects the signal intensity,
which typically corresponds to the largest intensity. Also, we
shall consider a non-iterative sifting strategy which protects
the protocol against the sifting attack [31]. We remark,
however, that there exist iterative sifting strategies that can
also guarantee the security of QKD against the sifting attack,
like the one introduced in [32] and they could be used here as
well.
Before describing the protocol, we first present briefly the
assumptions on the user’s devices.
(1) The global phase of each coherent pulse generated by
Alice is randomized.
(2) The joint state of all the pulses generated by Alice is in
a tensor product. That is, there is no correlation among
pulses in the absence of information leakage.
(3) The coherent light generated by Alice does not suffer from
intensity fluctuations.
(4) Perfect encoding of the bit and basis information. That is,
the phase modulation values applied to the coherent pulses
generated by Alice’s source are exactly {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}.
(5) Alice’s phase modulator modulates only the phase of the
pulses, and her intensity modulator modulates only the
intensity of the pulses. The state of a pulse emitted
by Alice’s source is in a single mode. That is, in the
absence of information leakage, Alice’s modulators do
not introduce side-channels. (Note that in the presence
of information leakage, the state of Alice’s pulses is not in
a single mode anymore.)
(6) The efficiency of Bob’s detectors is basis independent for
any received pulses.
Bellow, we describe the protocol that we consider in more
detail. Note, however, that the analysis presented in Sec. III
can be adapted as well to other prescriptions of the decoy-state
BB84 protocol.
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FIG. 1. The sender Alice has a photon source to generate light pulses. She uses an IM to generate decoy states and a PM for state encoding. Eve has full
control of the quantum channel (thin solid arrow). In an active THA, Eve injects bright light pulses (thick solid arrow) into Alice’s transmitter and then she
measures the back-reflected light (thin dashed arrow) to extract information about Alice’s state preparation process.
The protocol we consider includes an unusual step where
Alice and Bob probabilistically post-select part of their
data (see step 3 in the description of the protocol below),
which is necessary for the finite-key security analysis to go
through. Indeed, this step guarantees that the actual protocol
is equivalent to the fictitious protocol that we consider in order
to estimate the phase error rate in Sec III. B 2.
Protocol
1. State preparation. The first two steps of the protocol
are repeated N times. In each round, Alice randomly
selects a bit value 0 or 1. Then she probabilistically
selects a basis χA ∈ {Z, X} with probabilities pZ and
pX = 1 − pZ, respectively, and an intensity γj where
j ∈ {s, v,w} and γs > γv > γw ≥ 0, with probability
pj . Then she prepares a phase-randomised WCP of
intensity γj in the chosen basis state of χA and sends
it to Bob via a quantum channel.
2. Measurement. Bob selects a basis χB ∈ {Z, X} with
probabilities pZ and pX, respectively, to measure the
state received from Alice and records the outcome.
3. Random data post-selection: Once the N rounds of
quantum transmission and measurement have finished,
Bob announces in which rounds he got a click event.
For each click event, Alice selects a fictitious basis Zc
or Xc with probability pZAc and pXAc = 1 − pZAc ,
respectively, and she announces her selection.
4. Sifting: If Alice’s choice was the Xc basis, Bob declares
his measurement basis choice but Alice does not declare
her state preparation basis choice and then they discard
the corresponding data. If Alice’s choice was the Zc
basis, both Alice and Bob declare their basis choices,
that is, Alice declares the basis that she chose to prepare
the state and Bob declares his measurement basis
choice, and Alice also announces her intensity setting
via an authenticated classical channel. We denote byZj
(Xj) the set of indexes that identifies the click events
where Alice chose the Zc basis and the intensity γj and
both Alice and Bob chose the basis Z (X). If the sifting
conditions |Zj | ≥ N jZ and |Xj | ≥ N jX are satisfied for
all j, where N jZ and N
j
X are predetermined threshold
values, Alice and Bob proceed to execute the following
steps of the protocol [33] If the sifting conditions are
not satisfied, the protocol aborts.
5. Parameter estimation. Alice and Bob estimate a lower
bound, which we denote by NLclick,0,γs|Z (N
L
click,1,γs|Z),
on the number of vacuum (single-photon) click events
in the sifted key data identified by the set Zs. Also
they use all the data indexed by the sets Zj and Xj
to estimate an upper bound on the single-photon phase
error rate, which we denote by eUph, of the sifted key
data indexed by Zs.
6. Information reconciliation and privacy amplification.
Alice and Bob perform an error correction step for a
predetermined quantum bit error rate, QBER, which
we denote by EsZ. Then, they perform an error
verification step, in which Alice computes a hash of
length log2
1
εcor
(where εcor is the correctness parameter
of the protocol [34, 35]) of the corrected sifted key data
indexed by Zs. For this, Alice uses a random universal2
hash function and she sends Bob both the hash value
and the hash function to verify that their corrected keys
are indeed identical. If this error verification step is
successful, they perform a privacy amplification step
by applying a random universal2 hash function to the
corrected sifted key data indexed by Zs to distill a
shorter bit string of length ` that constitutes the final
secret key.
By using the finite-key security analysis introduced in [16],
we have that the length ` of the secret key is lower bounded
by
` ≥ NLclick,0,γs|Z +NLclick,1,γs|Z
[
1−H
(
eUph
)]
−leakEC − log2 2ε2sec−ε − log2
2
εcor
,
(2)
whereH(x) = −xlog2(x)−(1− x)log2(1− x) is the binary
Shannon entropy function, leakEC is the amount of syndrome
information revealed by Alice in the error correction step of
the protocol, εsec is the secrecy parameter of the protocol [34,
35], and ε ≤ 1 − εZ,0εZ,1εph,1, where εZ,0, εZ,1 and εph,1
are defined as the success probabilities associated to the
4estimation of the parameters NLclick,0,γs|Z, N
L
click,1,γs|Z and
eUph, respectively. That is, ε is the probability that at least
one of the estimations NLclick,0,γs|Z, N
L
click,1,γs|Z and e
U
ph is
incorrect. The main goal of the next section is to estimate the
parameters NLclick,0,γs|Z, N
L
click,1,γs|Z and e
U
ph in the presence
of information leakage.
III. PARAMETER ESTIMATION IN THE PRESENCE OF
INFORMATION LEAKAGE
For concreteness we shall assume that Eve launches an
active THA against the main optical components of the decoy-
state transmitter, which are the IM that generates pulses with
different intensities, and the PM that encodes the bit and
basis information into the pulses. We remark, however, that
our analysis could also be applied to any passive information
leakage scenario. More precisely, we shall consider that Eve
sends bright light pulses into Alice’s transmitter and then she
measures the back-reflected light to obtain partial information
about the quantum state emitted by Alice each given time. For
simplicity of analysis, we assume that Eve launches THAs
against the IM and PM separately. Importantly, as we will see
in detail below, a THA against the IM affects the estimation
of the parameters NLclick,0,γs|Z, N
L
click,1,γs|Z and e
U
ph, while a
THA against the PM only has effect on the estimation of the
parameter eUph.
A. Estimation of the parameters NLclick,0,γs|Z and N
L
click,1,γs|Z
With her THA against the IM, Eve could obtain partial
information about Alice’s intensity setting choice in each
round of the protocol. This violates a key assumption of
the decoy-state method and, as a consequence, the typical
procedure [36] to estimate the parameters NLclick,0,γs|Z and
NLclick,1,γs|Z needs to be modified in order to take this effect
into account. For this we first review the results introduced
in [1] which analyze this scenario in the asymptotic case
where the number of signals transmitted is infinite. These
seminal results provide a relationship between the expected
number of click events for different intensity settings. Then
we extend this analysis to the finite-key regime by mainly
using Azuma’s inequality [26].
Moreover, for simplicity and for the moment, we shall
assume that pZAc = 1, i .e., we disregard the ‘random data
post-selection’ step of the protocol. This is possible because
this step is not needed to analyze the information leakage from
the IM but it is only needed for the analysis of the information
leakage from the PM.
1. Asymptotic Case
The key idea is rather simple. Suppose, for instance, that
Alice has m different intensity setting choices and let us
denote the intensity set by S = {γ1, γ2, ..., γm}. Also,
let S1 and S2 be any two non-empty disjoint subsets of S
(i .e., S1 6= ∅, S2 6= ∅ where ∅ denotes the empty set, and
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅). In a THA against the IM, Eve first prepares a
probe system Ep (which might be entangled with an ancillary
system, Ea, which could be, for instance, a quantum memory
in her laboratory) and then she sends this system to Alice.
Afterwards, she performs a joint measurement on the back-
reflected light fromEp, which we denote byE′p, together with
all the optical pulses emitted by Alice and the systemEa to try
to obtain information about Alice’s intensity setting choices.
By using the trace distance argument [37], it is easy to show
that when Alice sends Bob an n-photon state in the basis χ in
the ith trial and Bob measures the incoming signal also in the
χ basis with χ ∈ {Z, X}, we have that [1]∣∣Pri (click |n, S1, χ )− Pri (click |n, S2, χ )∣∣ ≤ Din,S1,S2,χ,
(3)
where Pri (click |n, Sα, χ ) is the conditional probability that
Bob’s detectors click in the ith trial given that Alice selects
an intensity in Sα (with α ∈ {1, 2}) and sends Bob an n-
photon pulse and Bob selects the χ basis. Denote by ργ
l,i
n,χ the
normalized state which is the joint state of Alice’s n-photon
pulse given that she selects the intensity γl and the basis χ in
the ith trial, and Eve’s systems Ea and E′p. Then we have
ρSα,in,χ =
1
N
∑
l|γl∈Sα
(
plp
l
nρ
γl,i
n,χ
)
, (4)
where pln is the conditional probability that Alice emits a pulse
with n photons given that she chooses the intensity setting l
and N = ∑l plpln is the normalization factor. That is, the
normalized state ρSα,in,χ denotes the joint state of Alice’s n-
photon pulse in the ith trial when she selects an intensity in
the subset Sα and the basis χ, and Eve’s systems Ea and E′p.
The parameterDin,S1,S2,χ, on the other hand, denotes the trace
distance between the states ρS1,in,χ and ρ
S2,i
n,χ and it is given by
Din,S1,S2,χ :=
1
2
Tr
[√(
ρS1,in,χ − ρS2,in,χ
)2]
. (5)
For simplicity and without loss of generality, from now on
we focus on the three-intensity case which we have described
in the previous section. This means, in particular, that we can
assume that S1 = {γj} and S2 = {γk, γl} with j, k, l ∈
{s, v,w} and where k might be equal to l. Then Eq. (3) can
be rewritten as∣∣Pri (click |n, S1, χ )− Pri (click |n, S2, χ )∣∣
= |Pri (click ∣∣n, γj , χ)− [qnklPri (click ∣∣n, γk, χ)
+(1− qnkl)Pri
(
click
∣∣n, γl, χ)]|
≤ Din,{γj},{γk,γl},χ, (6)
for k, l 6= j and where we have used the fact that ρS2,in,χ =
qnklρ
γk,i
n,χ +(1−qnkl)ργ
l,i
n,χ with qnkl := pkp
k
n/(pkp
k
n + plp
l
n).
By multiplying both sides of Eq. (6) by pjpjn and taking the
sum over i = {1, 2, ..., Nχ} with Nχ being the number of
5events where Alice sends a pulse in the χ basis and Bob
measures it also in the χ basis, we obtain∣∣∣∣ Nχ∑
i=1
Pri
(
click, n, γj |χ)− pjpjn Nχ∑
i=1
[
qnkl
×Pr
i
(
click, n, γk |χ)
pkpkn
+ (1− qnkl)
Pri
(
click, n, γl |χ)
plpln
]∣∣∣∣
≤ pjpjnNχDn,{γj},{γk,γl},χ, (7)
where Pri
(
click, n, γj |χ) denotes the conditional
probability that in the ith trial Alice selects the intensity
γj and sends Bob an n-photon pulse, and Bob’s detectors
click given that both Alice and Bob select the χ basis, and
Dn,{γj},{γk,γl},χ =
1
Nχ
Nχ∑
i=1
Din,{γj},{γk,γl},χ. (8)
The quantity
∑Nχ
i=1 Pr
i
(
click, n, γj |χ) represents the
conditional expected number of events where Alice selects
the intensity γj and sends Bob an n-photon pulse, and Bob’s
detectors click given that both Alice and Bob select the χ
basis. We will denote it by Eclick,n,γj |χ and, with this notation,
Eq. (7) has the following form:∣∣∣Eclick,n,γj |χ − [qnkl pjpjnpkpkn Eclick,n,γk|χ
+ (1− qnkl) pjp
j
n
plpln
Eclick,n,γl|χ
]∣∣∣
≤ pjpjnNχDn,{γj},{γk,γl},χ. (9)
From Eq. (9), it is now straightforward to obtain the
expressions that relate the expected number of click events
associated to different intensity settings. For this, let us first
consider the case where l = k. That is, here Eve wants to
discriminate between any pair of possible intensity settings.
In this case Eq. (9) can be rewritten as follows:∣∣∣∣Eclick,n,γj |χ − pjpjnpkpkn Eclick,n,γk|χ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ pjpjnNχDn,{γj},{γk},χ,
(10)
where
Dn,{γj},{γk},χ = 1Nχ
Nχ∑
i=1
Din,{γj},{γk},χ
:= 12Nχ
Nχ∑
i=1
Tr
[√(
ργ
j ,i
n,χ − ργk,in,χ
)2]
.
(11)
Eq (10) can be equivalently written as:
Eclick,n,γj |χ = pjp
j
n
pkpkn
Eclick,n,γk|χ + ∆jkχ,n, (12)
where ∆jkχ,n lies in an interval[−pjpjnNχDn,{γj},{γk},χ, pjpjnNχDn,{γj},{γk},χ]. Note
that the situation where Alice’s transmitters are perfectly
shielded from Eve corresponds to the case where ∆jkχ,n = 0
and then, as expected, Eclick,n,γj |χ = pjp
j
n
pkpkn
Eclick,n,γk|χ for all
j, k ∈ {s, v,w}.
Similarly, by taking, for instance, {j = v, k = s} and
{j = w, k = s}, we obtain the following two equations:
Eclick,n,γv|χ = pvp
v
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ + ∆vsχ,n,
Eclick,n,γw|χ = pwp
w
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ + ∆wsχ,n.
(13)
That is, we can relate Eclick,n,γv|χ and Eclick,n,γw|χ to
Eclick,n,γs|χ by means of the deviation terms ∆vsχ,n and ∆wsχ,n
which arise from information leaked by the IM. We remark
that by using different combinations of j and k, one can
obtain more constraints which are similar to those given by
Eq. (13). In any case, our simulation results suggest that the
contribution of these additional constraints is negligible once
one has already taken into account those imposed by Eq. (13).
To conclude the analysis in the asymptotic scenario, let us
now consider the case where k 6= l. In this situation, it is easy
to show that Eq. (9) implies the following:
Eclick,n,γs|χ = qnvw psp
s
n
pvpvn
Eclick,n,γv|χ
+ (1− qnvw) psp
s
n
pwpwn
Eclick,n,γw|χ + ∆svwχ,n ,
Eclick,n,γv|χ = qnsw pvp
v
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ
+ (1− qnsw) pvp
v
n
pwpwn
Eclick,n,γw|χ + ∆vswχ,n ,
Eclick,n,γw|χ = qnsv pwp
w
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ
+ (1− qnsv) pwp
w
n
pvpvn
Eclick,n,γv|χ + ∆wsvχ,n ,
(14)
where ∆jklχ,n lies in an interval[−pjpjnNχDn,{γj},{γk,γl},χ, pjpjnNχDn,{γj},{γk,γl},χ].
By combining equations (13) and (14), and by taking also
into account the bounds on all the parameters ∆jklχ,n, we find
that these deviation parameters have to fulfill the following
conditions:∣∣∣∣qnvw pspsnpvpvn∆vsχ,n + (1− qnvw) psp
s
n
pwpwn
∆wsχ,n
∣∣∣∣
≤ pspsnNχDn,{γs},{γv,γw},χ,∣∣∣∣∆vsχ,n − (1− qnsw) pvpvnpwpwn ∆wsχ,n
∣∣∣∣
≤ pvpvnNχDn,{γv},{γs,γw},χ,∣∣∣∣∆wsχ,n − (1− qnsv) pwpwnpvpvn ∆vsχ,n
∣∣∣∣
≤ pwpwnNχDn,{γw},{γs,γv},χ. (15)
In the asymptotic limit where Alice sends an infinite
number of pulses to Bob, thanks to Azuma’s inequality [26],
the actual numbers converge to the expected numbers of
events. However, in the finite key regime, there is some
deviation between these two quantities, and this is analyzed
in the next section.
2. Finite-key Regime
The analysis from the previous section can be easily
extended to the realistic finite-key scenario where Alice sends
6Bob a finite number N of pulses. For this, we use Azuma’s
inequality [26]. This inequality allows us to relate the
probability of certain events to the actual number of such
events in a finite scenario even when there are arbitrary
correlations between different trials due to Eve’s actions. It
states that if a sequence of random variables satisfies the
martingale and the bounded difference conditions, then
Eλ ≡
N∑
i=1
Pri(λ|λ−−→
i−1) = Nλ + δλ, (16)
where Eλ denotes the expected number of times that the
event ‘λ’ occurs in N trials, Pri(λ|λ−−→
i−1) is the conditional
probability to observe the event ‘λ’ in the ith trial given
the results of the first i − 1 trials, Nλ represents the actual
number of times that the event ‘λ’ occurs in N trials in an
actual experiment, and the parameter δλ denotes the deviation
term between the expected number and the actual number of
times that the event ‘λ’ occurs due to statistical fluctuations.
Importantly, according to Azuma’s inequality we have that the
quantity δλ lies in an interval [−∆λ, ∆̂λ] except for a small
error probability ελ + ε̂λ, where the bounds ∆λ and ∆̂λ are
given by ∆λ = f(N, ελ) and ∆̂λ = f(N, ε̂λ), respectively,
with the function f(x, y) =
√
2x ln 1/y. We refer the reader
to Appendix A for more details about Azuma’s inequality.
To use Azuma’s inequality in our analysis, let ‘λ’ be the
event where Alice selects the intensity γj and sends Bob a
state, and Bob’s detectors click given that both Alice and Bob
select the χ basis. Then, from Eq. (16) we have that
Eclick,γj |χ ≡
Nχ∑
i=1
Pri(click, γj
∣∣∣χ, λ−−→i−1 )
= Nclick,γj |χ + δjχ.
(17)
Here we restrict ourselves to the actual number of trials, Nχ,
where both Alice and Bob select the χ basis. The quantity
Pri(click, γj |χ, λ−−→
i−1) denotes the conditional probability that
in the ith trial Alice selects the intensity γj and sends Bob a
state, and Bob’s detectors click given that both Alice and Bob
select the χ basis and conditional on the outcomes obtained
in the first i− 1 trials, and Nclick,γj |χ is the actual number of
such events in Nχ trials. The parameter δjχ lies in an interval
[−∆jχ, ∆̂jχ] except for a small error probability εjχ + ε̂jχ
where the bounds ∆jχ and ∆̂
j
χ can be directly calculated from
Azuma’s inequality.
On the other hand, we also have that
Eclick,n,γj |χ ≡
Nχ∑
i=1
Pri(click, n, γj
∣∣∣χ, λ−−→i−1 )
= Nclick,n,γj |χ + δjχ,n,
(18)
where Nclick,n,γj |χ represents the actual number of events
where Alice selects the intensity γj and sends Bob an n-
photon pulse, and Bob’s detectors click within Nχ trials given
that both Alice and Bob select the χ basis, and δjχ,n denotes a
deviation term which lies in an interval [−∆jχ,n, ∆̂jχ,n] except
for a small error probability εjχ,n + ε̂
j
χ,n.
From Eqs (17) and (18), we have therefore that
Eclick,γj |χ =
∞∑
n=0
Eclick,n,γj |χ
=
∞∑
n=0
Nclick,n,γj |χ +
∞∑
n=0
δjχ,n.
(19)
That is, Nclick,γj |χ =
∞∑
n=0
Nclick,n,γj |χ and δjχ =
∞∑
n=0
δjχ,n.
Given the above linear equations that relate the expected
number of events to the actual number of them, we can
estimate the parameters NLclick,0,γs|Z and N
L
click,1,γs|Z by
solving a linear optimization problem. More precisely, if we
combine Eqs (13) and (19), we obtain
Eclick,γs|χ =
∞∑
n=0
Eclick,n,γs|χ
=
∞∑
n=0
(
Nclick,n,γs|χ + δsχ,n
)
,
Eclick,γv|χ =
∞∑
n=0
Eclick,n,γv|χ
=
∞∑
n=0
(
pvp
v
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ + ∆vsχ,n
)
=
∞∑
n=0
(
pvp
v
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ
)
+ ∆vsχ
=
∞∑
n=0
pvp
v
n
pspsn
(
Nclick,n,γs|χ + δsχ,n
)
+ ∆vsχ ,
Eclick,γw|χ =
∞∑
n=0
Eclick,n,γw|χ
=
∞∑
n=0
(
pwp
w
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ + ∆wsχ,n
)
=
∞∑
n=0
(
pwp
w
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ
)
+ ∆wsχ
=
∞∑
n=0
pwp
w
n
pspsn
(
Nclick,n,γs|χ + δsχ,n
)
+ ∆wsχ ,
(20)
where ∆ksχ =
∞∑
n=0
∆ksχ,n with k ∈ {v,w}. Finally, by
combining these results with Eq (17), we obtain the following
linear constraints:
Nclick,γs|χ =
∞∑
n=0
(
Nclick,n,γs|χ + δsχ,n
)− δsχ,
Nclick,γv|χ
=
∞∑
n=0
pvp
v
n
pspsn
(
Nclick,n,γs|χ + δsχ,n
)
+ ∆vsχ − δvχ,
Nclick,γw|χ
=
∞∑
n=0
pwp
w
n
pspsn
(
Nclick,n,γs|χ + δsχ,n
)
+ ∆wsχ − δwχ ,
(21)
where the bounds on the parameters δsχ,n and δ
l
χ with
l ∈ {s, v,w} can be calculated by using Azuma’s inequality
and the bounds on the parameters ∆ksχ are given by
−∑∞n=0 pkpknNχDn,k,s ≤ ∆ksχ ≤ ∑∞n=0 pkpknNχDn,k,s.
Importantly, Eq. (21) relates the actual observed quantities
Nclick,γj |χ to the quantities that we want to estimate,
Nclick,n,γs|χ. For instance, to obtain NLclick,0,γs|Z
(NLclick,1,γs|Z), we set χ = Z and solve a linear program
that minimizes Nclick,0,γs|χ (Nclick,1,γs|χ) given basically the
7constraints imposed by Eq. (21). Such a linear program can
be solved either analytically or numerically. In this work,
we employ the numerical approach. For this, since there
are an infinite number of unknown variables in Eq. (21),
it is necessary to reduce the variables to a finite set. More
technical details about how this is done can be found in
Appendix B.
B. Estimation of the parameter eUph
The definition of the phase error rate, eph, is given by
eph =
Nphase error
Nclick,1,γs|Z
≤ N
U
phase error
NLclick,1,γs|Z
≡ eUph, (22)
where Nphase error denotes the number of phase errors in
the set indexed by Zs1, i .e., within the single-photon click
events where Alice uses the signal intensity setting and both
Alice and Bob select the Z basis. The parameter NUphase error
denotes an upper bound on Nphase error. A phase error
is defined as the fictitious error that Alice and Bob would
observe in a fictitious scenario (where Alice prepares the
single-photon states in the Z basis by first generating a
bipartite entangled state and then measuring the ancillary
system of such a state in the Z basis) if Alice measured her
ancillary system in the X basis instead of using the Z basis,
and Bob also measured the incoming signal in the X basis,
rather than in the Z basis. This will be further explained below.
To estimate NUphase error we will evaluate two possible
scenarios. In the first one we consider information leakage
only from the IM, and in the second scenario we consider
information leakage from both the IM and the PM.
1. Information leakage only from the IM
Here we follow the same procedure used in [12, 14].
That is, we first estimate a lower bound on the number
of single-photon click events in the X basis with intensity
γs, which we denote by NLclick,1,γs|X, and an upper bound
on the corresponding number of errors in the single-photon
states in the X basis with intensity γs, which we denote
by NUerror,1,γs|X. These estimations can be done by using
a similar method like that used to calculate NLclick,0,γs|Z
and NLclick,1,γs|Z. Next we apply a random sampling
argument. Specifically, from NLclick,1,γs|X, N
U
error,1,γs|X and
the previously estimated quantityNLclick,1,γs|Z we can estimate
an upper bound on the number of phase errors in the data
indexed by the set Zs1 to obtain N
U
phase error. This is possible
because here we assume that the single-photon emissions are
basis independent.
More precisely, NLclick,1,γs|X can be derived by using the
same linear program which is used to calculate NLclick,1,γs|Z
after replacing all the parameters and variables in the Z basis
with those in the X basis. To derive NUerror,1,γs|X, we now
focus on the error events instead of the click events. In
so doing, it is straightforward to show that one can obtain
the following equations which are similar to those given by
Eq. (21):
Nerror,γs|X =
∞∑
n=0
(
Nerror,n,γs|X + δEsX,n
)
− δEsX ,
Nerror,γv|X =
∞∑
n=0
pvp
v
n
pspsn
(
Nerror,n,γs|X + δEsX,n
)
+∆vsX − δEvX ,
Nerror,γw|X =
∞∑
n=0
pwp
w
n
pspsn
(
Nerror,n,γs|X + δEsX,n
)
+∆wsX − δEwX .
(23)
where Nerror,γj |X denotes the actual number of events where
Alice sends Bob a pulse with intensity γj and they obtain
an error given that both Alice and Bob select the X basis.
Nerror,n,γj |X denotes the actual number of events where Alice
sends Bob an n-photon pulse with intensity γj and they
obtain an error given that both Alice and Bob select the
X basis, and δEjX , δEjX,n are the corresponding deviation
terms, respectively, which can be bounded by using Azuma’s
inequality. Then, NUerror,1,γs|X can be obtained by solving a
linear program that maximizes the value ofNerror,1,γs|X given
the set of linear constraints imposed by Eq. (23).
As already mentioned above, from the parameters
NLclick,1,γs|Z, N
L
click,1,γs|X and N
U
error,1,γs|X, one can use a
random sampling argument to derive eUph. See Appendix B
for further details.
2. Information leakage from the IM and the PM
In principle, a THA against the PM allows Eve to learn
partial information about Alice’s basis choice each given time.
That is, the outgoing states from by Alice’s transmitter (which
include the states emitted by Alice together with the back-
reflected light from Eve’s attack) are now basis dependent and
thus they carry information about the particular basis used
by Alice to prepare them. In this situation, we cannot use
the techniques used in the previous section for estimating the
phase error rate. The security of QKD with basis dependent
states has been analyzed in a previous work [8], where the
authors used the idea of a quantum coin [27, 28] to relate the
balance of such a coin to the basis dependence of the signals
prepared by Alice. In this section, we apply the same idea
to estimate NUphase error. Like previously, we first review the
results introduced in [1, 7] which are valid in the asymptotic
limit of large N . Next, we adapt them to the finite-key regime
by mainly using Azuma’s inequality [26].
Asymptotic Case: For ease of illustration, let us first consider
a scenario where Alice’s source is a single-photon source. As
already mentioned above, in the presence of a THA against
the PM, the joint state of the single-photon states emitted
by Alice together with Eve’s back-reflected light could be
basis dependent. We shall denote the joint state of Alice’s
single-photon signals and Eve’s systems given that Alice
8selects the Z (X) basis in the ith trial by
∣∣ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,Ea,E′p
(
∣∣ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,Ea,E′p ) [1]. Here, Aq denotes a virtual qubit,
which contains Alice’s bit value choice, Ap represents Alice’s
photonic system that she sends to Bob via a quantum channel
and Aa is an additional ancillary system in Alice’s hands to
account for the loss in her transmitter. For example, these
states could have the following form:
∣∣ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,Ea,E′p = 1√2
(
|0〉Aq
∣∣ϕi0Z〉Ap,Aa,Ea,E′p
+|1〉Aq
∣∣ϕi1Z〉Ap,Aa,Ea,E′p
)
,∣∣ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,Ea,E′p = 1√2
(
|+〉Aq
∣∣ϕi0X〉Ap,Aa,Ea,E′p
+|−〉Aq
∣∣ϕi1X〉Ap,Aa,Ea,E′p
)
,
(24)
where |ϕibχA〉Ap,Aa,Ea,E′p with b ∈ {0, 1} denotes the joint
the state of the systems Ap, Aa, Ea, and E′p for Alice’s choice
of the bit value ‘b’ and basis ‘χA’ in the ith trial.
Then, as already explained above, a phase error is the
fictitious error that Alice and Bob would observe if Alice
measured the system Aq in the X basis and Bob measured
the incoming signal also in the X basis given that Alice
prepared the state
∣∣ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,Ea,E′p . To estimate this
quantity we use a fictitious protocol. A sketch of this
fictitious protocol is as follows (see Appendix. D for a more
detailed description of each step of the fictitious protocol
and its equivalence to the actual protocol). In particular,
in the ith trial we assume that Alice prepares the state∣∣Ψi〉
Ac,Aq,Ap,Aa,E′p,Ea
=
√
pZA |0〉Ac
∣∣ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E′p,Ea +√
pXA |1〉Ac
∣∣ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E′p,Ea , where Ac is a so-called
quantum coin [27, 28]. She keeps the systems Ac, Aq and Aa
in her hands, and she sends system Ap to Bob. Bob performs a
quantum nondemolition (QND) measurement on the received
signal and determines if this signal will produce a click in his
measurement device. For each click event determined by the
QND measurement, Bob performs an X basis measurement
on the received state and Alice also measures her system Aq
in the X basis. Besides, Alice selects the ZAc or XAc basis
with probabilities pZAc and pXAc , respectively, to measure the
quantum coin in the selected basis. Importantly, these steps
can be executed such that the actual and fictitious protocols
are equivalent from Eve’s point of view.
By applying the Bloch sphere bound in terms of
probabilities [38] to this virtual scenario, one obtains
1− 2Pri (XAc = − |click, sb,X− error,XAc )
≤ 2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1 |click, sb,X− error,ZAc )
×
√
1− Pri (ZAc = 1 |click, sb,X− error,ZAc ),
(25)
1− 2Pri (XAc = − |click, sb,No X− error,XAc )
≤ 2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1 |click, sb,No X− error,ZAc )
×
√
1− Pri (ZAc = 1 |click, sb,No X− error,ZAc ),
(26)
where Pri (XAc = − |click, sb, X− error,XAc ) is the
conditional probability that the X basis measurement result
on the quantum coin is ‘−’ in the ith trial given that Bob
obtains a click in his measurement device, Alice and Bob
select the same basis (sb) for the state preparation and
measurement, respectively, Bob’s measurement outcome
differs from that obtained by Alice when she measures her
system Aq, which we shall call an X basis error, and Alice
performs the XAc basis measurement on the quantum coin.
The other conditional probabilities that appear in Eqs (25)
and (26) are defined similarly.
Next, we multiply Eqs. (25) and (26) by
Pri (ZAc |click)Pri (sb,X− error |click,XAc ) and
Pri (ZAc |click)Pri (sb,No X− error |click,XAc ),
respectively, and add both terms together. The result is
given by
Pri (ZAc |click)− 2Pri (ZAc |click) Pri (XAc = − |click,XAc )
≤ 2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1,X− error,ZAc |click) Pri (ZAc = 0,X− error,ZAc |click)
+2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1,No X− error,ZAc |click) Pri (ZAc = 0,No X− error,ZAc |click).
(27)
To obtain the expression above, we have taken into account
that the events ‘XAc ’ and ‘ZAc ’ are independent of the events
‘click’ and ‘sb’, and the event ‘click’ is independent of the
event ‘sb’ as well, and we also have removed the common
factor ‘Pri (sb)’ that appears on both sides. More details
about this calculation can be found in Appendix D.
To relate the joint probabilities in Eq. (27) to the expected
numbers of events, we take the sum over i ∈ {1, 2, ..., Nclick},
where Nclick is the number of clicks. Due to the concavity of
the square root function, we have that
9Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc |click)− 2
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc |click) Pri (XAc = − |click,XAc )
≤ 2
√
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 1,X− error,ZAc |click)
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 0,X− error,ZAc |click)
+2
√
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 1,No X− error,ZAc |click)
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 0,No X− error,ZAc |click).
(28)
If we denote the expected number of times that event ‘λ’
occurs after Nclick trials by Eλ, Eq. (28) can be rewritten as
pZAcNclick − 2
pZAc
pXAc
EXAc=−
≤ 2√EX,X−errorEZ,X−error
+2
√EX,No X−errorEZ,No X−error, (29)
where we have also used the fact that
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc |click) = pZAc
Nclick∑
i=1
1 = pZAcNclick,
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc |click) Pri (XAc = − |click,XAc )
=
Nclick∑
i=1
pZAc
Pri(XAc=−,XAc |click )
Pri(XAc |click )
=
pZAc
pXAc
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (XAc = −,XAc |click)
=:
pZAc
pXAc
EXAc=−.
(30)
In Appendix D one can see that to upper bound EXAc=−
we take a worst-case scenario where we assume that all
the events ‘XAc = −’ are detected. Note that, EX,X−error
denotes the expected number of click events where Alice
chooses the ZAc basis to measure the quantum coin and
obtains the measurement outcome ‘1’ (corresponding to the
preparation of
∣∣ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,Ea,Ep ) and there is an X basis
error. Similarly, EZ,X−error denotes the expected number of
click events where Alice chooses the ZAc basis to measure
the quantum coin and obtains the measurement outcome ‘0’
(corresponding to the preparation of
∣∣ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,Ea,Ep ) and
there is an X basis error. The other expected numbers are
defined in an analogous way. Importantly, EZ,X−error is
actually equal to Nphase error. The quantity EXAc=− denotes
the expected number of ‘−’ among the X basis measurements
on the quantum coins, and these coins are associated to
Bob’s click events as well as Alice’s choice of the X basis
for measuring the quantum coins and it can be bounded by
using the overlap between the states
∣∣ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,Ea,E′p and∣∣ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,Ea,E′p defined above. See Appendix D for more
details.
Finite-key Regime: Since Azuma’s inequality can deal with
any correlation among events (for instance, caused by a
coherent attack by Eve), we use Azuma’s inequality to relate
the expected number of events to the corresponding actual
number, like we did to analyze the THA against the IM.
According to Azuma’s inequality [26], we have that
Eλ = Nλ + δλ, (31)
holds except for a probability exponentially small in the
number of trials, i .e., the click events, where Eλ denotes the
expected number of times that the event ‘λ’ occurs, and Nλ
denotes the actual number of times that the event ‘λ’ occurs.
δλ represents the corresponding deviation term and it lies in
an interval [−∆λ, ∆̂λ] except for a small error probability
ελ + ε̂λ where the bounds ∆λ and ∆̂λ can be calculated
by using Azuma’s inequality. Then, if we replace all the
expected numbers in Eq. (29) with the actual numbers plus
the corresponding deviation terms in the actual protocol, we
obtain:
pZAc (Nclick + δclick)− 2
pZAc
pXAc
(NXAc=− + δ
′
XAc=−
)
≤ 2√(NX,X−error + δX,X−error) (NZ,X−error + δZ,X−error)
+2
√(
Nclick|X −NX,X−error + δX,No X−error
)
×
√(
Nclick|Z −NZ,X−error + δZ,No X−error
)
(32)
except for an exponentially small error probability (ε′XAc=− +
ε̂′XAc=−)+
∑
λ (ελ + εˆλ), where λ ∈ {(X,X−error), (Z,X−
error), (X,No X − error), (Z,No X − error)}. Note that,
although in the actual protocol there is no data corresponding
to ‘NXAc=−’, this quantity can first be upper bounded
by using Eq. (61) in Appendix D in the asymptotic case,
and then an estimation of the actual number NXAc=− can
be derived by using the Chernoff bound [39] with an
exponentially small error probability and δ′XAc=− denoting
the corresponding deviation term (See Appendix D for
more details). In the above equation, Nclick|Z(X) denotes
the actual number of events where both Alice and Bob
select the Z (X) basis for measuring system Aq and the
incoming signal, respectively, and Bob obtains a click, i .e.,
Nclick|Z(X) = NZ(X),X−error +NZ(X),No X−error. NZ,X−error
is the quantity to be estimated.
So far all the analysis considers that Alice has a single-
photon source. However, it is straightforward to adapt the
analysis above to the decoy-state BB84 protocol described
in Sec. II where the secret key is only distilled from
the data corresponding to the signal intensity setting. For
this, we only need to consider that now all the actual
numbers that appear in Eq. (32) refer to the single-photon
contributions within the signal intensity setting, γs. That is,
now Nclick, NX,X−error, NZ,X−error, Nclick|X, Nclick|Z refer
to Nclick,1,γs , NX−error,1,γs|X, NX−error,1,γs|Z, Nclick,1,γs|X
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TABLE I. Experimental parameters used in the simulation. ed is the intrinsic
error rate due to the misalignment of the QKD system; pd is the dark count
rate of Bob’s detectors, where we assume for simplicity that it is equal
for all of them; ηdet is the overall detection efficiency of Bob’s receiver,
i.e., this parameter already includes the detection efficiency of his detectors
(which again we assume for simplicity is equal for all of them); α is the
loss coefficient of the channel measured in dB/km; γw is the intensity of the
weakest decoy state; fEC is the efficiency of the error correction code.
ed pd ηdet α γ
w fEC
0.01 5× 10−6 0.25 0.2 5× 10−4 1.2
, Nclick,1,γs|Z. One can use the same method based on linear
optimization that we used in the previous sections to estimate
Nclick,1,γs , NX−error,1,γs|X, NX−error,1,γs|Z, Nclick,1,γs|X,
Nclick,1,γs|Z. In so doing, one can estimate an upper bound
on NX−error,1,γs|Z and thus obtain eUph.
IV. SIMULATION
For illustration purposes, in the simulation we shall assume
that the information leakage comes from a THA where Eve
injects into Alice’s transmitter high-intensity single-mode
coherent states of the form |βeiθ〉 with β being the limited
amplitude of the input light and θ being the corresponding
phase which can have an arbitrary value. Since we do not have
an experimental characterization of how Alice’s modulators
behave, for simplicity in this section we shall assume that the
back-reflected light to Eve is still a coherent state of the form
|βkeiθk〉 with k ∈ {s, v,w}. The subscript k that appears
in both the amplitude and the phase of the back-reflected
state indicates that they may depend on the intensity setting
selected by Alice each given time. However, note that the
formalism presented in the previous section could be applied
as well to any other type of back-reflected light.
In the presence of information leakage, the length `′ of the
secret key is actually given by
`′ ≥ max
ΓAB
min
ΓE
`, (33)
where ` is given by Eq. (2). Here, ΓAB and ΓE denote
the spaces of the parameters controlled by Alice and Bob,
and Eve, respectively. In the simulation, we let ΓAB =
{γs, γv, pZAc , ps, pv, pZ} and ΓE = {θv, θw}. In addition
we assume that γw = 5 × 10−4 (which is a reasonable value
for the weakest decoy state as in practice it is difficult to
generate a perfect vacuum state due to the imperfect extinction
ratio of the IM), and, without loss of generality, we assume
that θs = 0. In addition, we consider for simplicity a
model where the amount of information revealed by Alice
during the error correction step of the protocol is given by
leakEC = |Zs|fECH(EsZ). For more accurate models of the
value of leakEC as a function ofN , we refer the reader to [40].
The experimental parameters considered in the simulation are
listed in table I.
To quantitatively show the results of our finite-key
estimation method in the presence of information leakage, we
simulate the secret key rates in the same three different cases
considered in [1]. In each case, there is a particular model for
the back-reflected light to the channel. The different values for
the trace distance terms Dn,{γj},{γk},χ and Dn,{γj},{γk,γl},χ
with j, k, l ∈ {s, v,w} for the leaked states in these three cases
are given in Appendix E.
A. Case 1
Since in our simulation we assume that the back-reflected
light is a coherent state of the form |βkeiθk〉 and the phases
θk can have arbitrary values controlled by Eve, the larger the
value of βk is, the more information is leaked to Eve. Here,
we consider a model where Alice and Bob may overestimate
the intensity of the back-reflected light leaked to Eve. In
particular, suppose that the intensity βk2 is upper bounded by
a certain value Imax for all k. Then, we assume a conservative
scenario for Alice and Bob, where
Imax = βs
2 = βv
2 = βw
2. (34)
The simulation result of the secret key rate, `′/N , as a
function of the transmission distance between Alice and Bob
in this case is shown in Fig. 2 (a) for a fixed value of the
total number of transmitted pulses, N = 1012. In this figure,
the black solid line represents the perfectly isolated situation
where there is no information leakage and the different
colored lines correspond to different amounts of information
leakage. More precisely, the coloured solid lines represent the
key rates in the presence of a THA against only the IM. If
we compare these results with the longest achievable distance
without information leakage, which is about 96 km, we find
that now the secret key rate vanishes at about 24 km when
Imax = 10
−6. In addition, we also find that if Imax is as
small as Imax = 10−12, then the secret key rate is very close
to the one corresponding to the ideal case where there is no
information leakage. This can be seen in Fig. 5 in Appendix
F. The coloured dashed lines shown in Fig. 2 (a) represent
the secret key rates in the presence of a THA against both
the IM and the PM. Here we assume that the intensity of
the back-reflected light from the PM is also Imax. Now the
secret key rates are obviously slightly lower than the ones
corresponding to a THA against only the IM. This effect
is more evident than in the asymptotic scenario considered
in [1], where the secret key rates considering information
leakage from both the IM and the PM basically coincide with
those in the presence of a THA against only the IM. This
is because of the following. Although it is not explicitly
written in [1], in the asymptotic case one can consider that the
probability pZAc is basically one, while in the finite-key case
we find that the optimized value of this parameter typically
lies in an interval [0.7, 0.95]. It is the probability with which
Alice selects part of the data corresponding to the click events
to be used for parameter estimation (while she discards the
other part of the data corresponding to the click events with
probability 1−pZAc ). That is, the larger the value of pZAc , the
higher the efficiency of the protocol and thus also its secret
key rate.
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FIG. 2. (a) The secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function
of the distance for a fixed value of the total number of transmitted pulses,
N = 1012. The black solid line represents the perfectly isolated situation
where there is no information leakage (i.e., Imax = 0) and the different
colored lines correspond to different amounts of information leakage. More
precisely, the coloured solid (dashed) lines represent the secret key rates in the
presence of a THA against the IM (both the IM and PM). (b) The secret key
rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance for two fixed values of
information leakage, Imax = {0, 10−7}. Different colored lines correspond
to different values of the number of transmitted pulses. Here we consider a
THA against both the IM and the PM. In our simulations, for each value of
the distance we maximize the secret key rate over the amplitudes γs and γv,
and the probabilities pZAc , ps, pv, pZ which are controlled by Alice and
Bob, and we minimize it over the angles θk controlled by Eve, respectively.
In Fig. 2 (b), the solid lines show the secret key rate as
a function of the distance for a fixed value Imax = 10−7
and for different values of the total number of transmitted
pulses. For comparison, this figure also plots the secret key
rate when Imax = 0, i.e., when there is no information leakage
(see dotted lines). This way we can see the effect of the
information leakage as a function of the number of pulses
sent. For example, when Imax = 10−7, the longest achievable
distance at which the secret key rate is positive is about 48 km
when the total number of transmitted pulses is N = 1012.
However, when N = 1010, this distance decreases to 35 km.
Additional simulation results can be found in Appendix F.
Our simulation results also suggest that when Imax
increases, the resulting secret key rate drops quicker when the
total number of transmitted pulses decreases. See Appendix F
for more details.
B. Case 2
Here we consider a scenario where the intensity of the back-
reflected light leaked to Eve depends on the intensity setting
selected by Alice each given time. This could happen because
Eve’s light might be reflected after the IM and then on its way
back to the channel it is modulated in exactly the same way as
Alice’s pulses are during the state preparation stage. This is
probably a more realistic scenario than that considered in the
previous case, which could be a bit overpessimistic. We have
therefore that now
Imax = βs
2 =
γs
γv
βv
2 =
γs
γw
βw
2. (35)
That is, here we assume that Imax = βs2, and the following
conditions hold βs2/βv2 = γs/γv and βs2/βw2 = γs/γw.
The simulation result of the secret key rate as a function
of the transmission distance between Alice and Bob when
N = 1012 and for different values of Imax is shown in
Fig. 3 (a). Fig. 3 (b), on the other hand, shows the secret
key rate as a function of the distance for two fixed values of
Imax = {0, 10−7} and different values of N . The behaviour
of different lines as well as the optimal range of pZA is very
similar to the one of case 1. The main difference is that
now the cut-off points where the secret key rate is zero are,
as expected, larger than the ones in the previous case. For
example, now when the total number of transmitted pulses is
1012 and Imax = 10−6, we find that the secret key is positive
up to about 34 km while in case 1 this distance is 24 km when
we consider information leakage only from the IM.
C. Case 3
Finally, in this case we consider that Alice applies a phase
randomization step to each signal leaving her transmitter.
Moreover, for simplicity, we assume that there is no
information leakage about the phase selected by Alice each
given time for the phase randomization step. In so doing, we
have that the state of Eve’s back-reflected light is of the form
ργk = e
−(βk)2
∞∑
n=0
(βk)
2
n!
|n〉 〈n| , (36)
where the amplitudes βk satisfy Eq. (35). That is, in this
case the information about Alice’s settings can only be leaked
to Eve through the amplitudes of the back-reflected light but
not through the phases. This is obviously the most beneficial
situation for Alice and Bob.
The simulation result of the secret key rate as a function
of the transmission distance between Alice and Bob when
N = 1012 and for different values of Imax is shown in
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FIG. 3. (a) The secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function
of the distance for a fixed value of the total number of transmitted pulses,
N = 1012. The black solid line represents the perfectly isolated situation
where there is no information leakage (i.e., Imax = 0) and the different
colored lines correspond to different amounts of information leakage. More
precisely, the coloured solid (dashed) lines represent the secret key rates in the
presence of a THA against the IM (both the IM and PM). (b) The secret key
rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance for two fixed values of
information leakage, Imax = {0, 10−7}. Different colored lines correspond
to different values of the number of transmitted pulses. Here we consider a
THA against both the IM and the PM. In our simulations, for each value of
the distance we maximize the secret key rate over the amplitudes γs and γv,
and the probabilities pZAc , ps, pv, pZ which are controlled by Alice and
Bob, and we minimize it over the angles θk controlled by Eve, respectively.
Fig. 4 (a) like in the previous two cases. Fig. 4 (b) shows
the finite-key effect on the secret key rate as a function of
the distance for two fixed values of Imax = {0, 10−3} and
for different values of N . Here, we find that the parameter
pZAc typically lies in an interval [0.75, 0.95] and the secret
key rate is obviously improved compared with the ones shown
in Figs 2 and 3. For example, when the total number of
transmitted pulses is 1012 and Imax = 10−4, the secret
key rate remains positive up to about 83 km (66 km) in the
presence of a THA against the IM (both the IM and the PM).
Recall that in case 2 the maximum achievable distance with
the same number of transmitted pulses and assuming an Imax
as low as 10−6 is about 34 km (30 km), and the situation in
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FIG. 4. (a) The secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function
of the distance for a fixed value of the total number of transmitted pulses,
N = 1012. The black solid line represents the perfectly isolated situation
where there is no information leakage (i.e., Imax = 0) and the different
colored lines correspond to different amounts of information leakage. More
precisely, the coloured solid (dashed) lines represent the secret key rates in the
presence of a THA against the IM (both the IM and PM). (b) The secret key
rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance for two fixed values of
information leakage, Imax = {0, 10−3}. Different colored lines correspond
to different values of the number of transmitted pulses. Here we consider a
THA against both the IM and the PM. In our simulations, for each value of
the distance we maximize the secret key rate over the amplitudes γs and γv,
and the probabilities pZAc , ps, pv, pZ which are controlled by Alice and
Bob, and we minimize it over the angles θk controlled by Eve, respectively.
case 1 is even worse. As already mentioned previously, this
is mainly because now Eve can not get information from the
phase of the output states.
In practice, however, Eve might also launch a THA to
determine the random phase used by Alice each given time
for phase randomization and the benefit of this step will be
reduced. This last scenario could be also analyzed with the
techniques presented in this paper and we omit it here for
simplicity.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the finite-key security of
a decoy-state QKD protocol in the presence of information
leakage from the two main active devices of Alice’s
transmitter: the intensity modulator (IM) and the phase
modulator (PM). For this, we have extended the results
introduced in [1] to the finite-key regime. More precisely,
we have evaluated the effect of information leakage from the
IM by means of a trace distance argument which provides
a relationship between the n-photon yields associated to
different intensity settings. To take statistical fluctuations
into account, we have used Azuma’s inequality. This
inequality considers arbitrary correlations between the
different receiving pulses at Bob’s side and thus is valid
against general attacks. To evaluate the effect of information
leakage from the PM, we have used the idea of a quantum
coin. This method provides a means to study the security
of a QKD system with basis dependent states. For the
finite-key security proof to go through, we have included a
classical post-processing step where Alice probabilistically
post-selects part of the data which is associated to those
detection events at Bob’s side to be used for parameter
estimation, while she discards the rest. This step reduces
slightly the overall efficiency of the protocol; it is left as
an open question whether there exist alternative procedures,
probably not based on a quantum coin idea, which can handle
information leakage from the PM without requiring such a
random post-selection step.
For illustration purposes, we have simulated the resulting
secret key rate in three practical examples of Trojan horse
attacks which Eve could launch against the QKD system, as a
function of the intensity of Eve’s back reflected light and the
total number of pulses sent by Alice. Our results demonstrate
the feasibility of quantum key distribution over long distances
and within a reasonable time frame given that Alice’s source
is sufficiently isolated. Also, for a given value of the isolation
of Alice’s source, we have shown that the effect that the
information leakage has on the secret key rate is greater when
the total number of transmitted pulses decreases.
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APPENDIX A. AZUMA’S INEQUALITY
Azuma’s inequality can be applied to random variables
which satisfy both the martingale condition and the bounded
difference condition (BDC) [26]. A sequence of random
variables {X(0), X(1), ..., X(k)} is called a martingale if and
only if the condition E
[
X(k+1)
∣∣X(0), X(1), ..., X(k) ] =
X(k) is satisfied for all k ≥ 0. Here, E[ · ] denotes
the expectation value. Moreover, we say that the sequence
{X(0), X(1), ..., X(k)} fulfills the BDC if and only if there
exists c(k) > 0 such that
∣∣X(k+1) −X(k)∣∣ ≤ c(k) for all
k ≥ 0. Suppose we have N trials whose kth event is specified
by a random variable X(k), then if X(k) is a martingale and
satisfies the BDC with c(k) = 1, Azuma’s inequality states
that [26]
Pr
[∣∣∣X(N) −X(0)∣∣∣ > Nδ] ≤ 2e−Nδ22 , (37)
holds for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
To derive the result in the main text, let us define a random
variable
X(k) := Π(k) −
k∑
j=1
Prj (ζj = 1 |ζ0, ζ1, ..., ζj−1) , (38)
where Π(k) denotes the actual observed number of events
during the first k trials, and Prj (ζj = 1 |ζ1, ζ2, ..., ζj−1) is
the conditional probability that in the jth trial the outcome is
‘1’ given that the first j − 1 outcomes are ζ0, ζ1, ..., ζj−1. It
can be shown that Eq. (38) is martingale and satisfies the BDC
with c(k) = 1. Therefore, according to Azuma’s inequality we
have that
Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∣Π(N) −
N∑
j=1
Prj (1 |ζ0, ..., ζj−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > Nδ
 ≤ 2e−Nδ22 .
(39)
Equivalently, this means that
Π(N) =
N∑
j=1
Prj (1 |ζ0, ..., ζj−1) + δA, (40)
except for error probability ε + εˆ, where the deviation term
δA lies in an interval [−∆, ∆ˆ] and the bounds are given by
∆ = f(N, ε) and ∆̂ = f(N, ε̂), respectively, with the
function f(x, y) =
√
2x ln(1/y). That is, ε quantifies the
error probability that δA is not lower bounded by −∆ and ε̂
quantifies the error probability that the parameter δA is not
upper bounded by ∆̂.
APPENDIX B. NUMERICAL ESTIMATION OF NLclick,0,γs|Z,
NLclick,1,γs|Z AND e
U
ph WITH INFORMATION LEAKAGE
FROM THE IM
Let us start with the estimation of NLclick,0,γs|Z. The first
step is to reduce the infinite number of unknown variables
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which appear in the linear constraints derived in the main text
to a finite set. Our starting point is Eq. (20). Due to the fact
that the expected number of clicks arising from certain events
is always greater than or equal to 0 but cannot be greater than
the number of pulses sent associated to such events, we have
that 0 ≤ Eclick,n,γj |χ ≤ Nχpjpjn for all n and j ∈ {s, v,w}.
This means, in particular, that
∞∑
n=0
(
pjp
j
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ
)
≥
Scut∑
n=0
(
pjp
j
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ
)
,
∞∑
n=0
(
pjp
j
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ
)
≤
Scut∑
n=0
(
pjp
j
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ
)
+
∞∑
n=Scut+1
(
pjp
j
n
pspsn
Nχpsp
s
n
)
=
Scut∑
n=0
(
pjp
j
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ
)
+NχpjT
j
Scut
,
(41)
where T jScut =
∞∑
n=Scut+1
pjn =1 −
Scut∑
n=0
pjn for any Scut ≥ 0.
Thus, we obtain the following equations:
Eclick,γs|χ ≥
Scut∑
n=0
Eclick,n,γs|χ,
Eclick,γs|χ ≤
Scut∑
n=0
Eclick,n,γs|χ +NχpsT sScut ,
Eclick,γv|χ ≥
Scut∑
n=0
pvp
v
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ + ∆vsχ ,
Eclick,γv|χ ≤
Scut∑
n=0
pvp
v
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ +NχpvT vScut + ∆vsχ ,
Eclick,γw|χ ≥
Scut∑
n=0
pwp
w
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ + ∆wsχ ,
Eclick,γw|χ ≤
Scut∑
n=0
pwp
w
n
pspsn
Eclick,n,γs|χ +NχpwTwScut + ∆wsχ ,
(42)
which now depend on a finite number of unknown variables.
Next, we replace the expected values Eclick,γj |χ and
Eclick,n,γj |χ with the corresponding actual numbers plus their
deviation terms by applying Eqs. (17) and (18), and we take
into account as well the constraints given by Eq. (15) after
considering any n ≤ Scut. This way, we find that to calculate
NLclick,0,γs|Z one could use the following linear program:
min Nclick,0,γs|Z
s.t. Nclick,γs|Z ≥
Scut∑
n=0
(
Nclick,n,γs|Z + δsZ,n
)− δsZ,
Nclick,γs|Z ≤
Scut∑
n=0
(
Nclick,n,γs|Z + δsZ,n
)
+NZpsT
s
Scut
− δsZ
Nclick,γv|Z ≥
Scut∑
n=0
pvp
v
n
pspsn
(
Nclick,n,γs|Z + δsZ,n
)
+ ∆vsZ − δvZ,
Nclick,γv|Z ≤
Scut∑
n=0
pvp
v
n
pspsn
(
Nclick,n,γs|Z + δsZ,n
)
+NZpvT
v
Scut
+ ∆vsZ − δvZ,
Nclick,γw|Z ≥
Scut∑
n=0
pwp
w
n
pspsn
(
Nclick,n,γs|Z + δsZ,n
)
+ ∆wsZ − δwZ ,
Nclick,γw|Z ≤
Scut∑
n=0
pwp
w
n
pspsn
(
Nclick,n,γs|Z + δsZ,n
)
+NZpwT
w
Scut
+ ∆wsZ − δwZ ,
0 ≤ Nclick,n,γs|Z + δsZ,n ≤ NZpspsn, ∀n ≤ Scut,
−∆jZ ≤ δjZ ≤ ∆̂jZ, −∆sZ,n ≤ δsZ,n ≤ ∆̂sZ,n, j ∈ {s, v,w}
−
∞∑
n=0
pkp
k
nNZDn,γk,γs ≤ ∆ksZ ≤
∞∑
n=0
pkp
k
nNZDn,γk,γs , k ∈ {v,w}
−Dn,{γs},{γv,γw} ≤ qnvwpspsnNZ
psp
s
n
pvpvn
∆vsZ +
(1−qnvw)
pspsnNZ
psp
s
n
pwpwn
∆wsZ ≤ Dn,{γs},{γv,γw}, ∀n ≤ Scut
−Dn,{γv},{γs,γw} ≤ 1pvpvnNZ ∆
vs
Z − (1−qnsw)pvpvnNZ
pvp
v
n
pwpwn
∆wsZ ≤ Dn,{γv},{γs,γw}, ∀n ≤ Scut
−Dn,{γw},{γs,γv} ≤ 1pwpwnNZ ∆
ws
Z − (1−qnsv)pwpwnNZ
pwp
w
n
pvpvn
∆vsZ ≤ Dn,{γw},{γs,γv}, ∀n ≤ Scut.
(43)
The linear program contains 2 × (Scut + 1) + 5 unknown
variables: Nclick,n,γs|Z, δsZ,n, ∆
vs
Z , ∆
ws
Z , δ
s
Z, δ
v
Z, and δ
w
Z . The
calculation of the parameters Dn,{γj},{γk,γl} with j, k, l ∈
{s, v,w} is provided in Appendix E and is taken from
Ref. [1]. The solution to the linear program above is directly
NLclick,0,γs|Z, being the total error probability equal to
εZ,0 =
∑
j=s,v,w
(εjZ + εˆ
j
Z) +
Scut∑
n=0
(
εsZ,n + εˆ
s
Z,n
)
, (44)
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where εjZ, εˆ
j
Z are the error probabilities associated to the
estimation of the bounds on δjZ and ε
s
Z,n, εˆ
s
Z,n are the error
probabilities associated to the estimation of the bounds on
δsZ,n, respectively.
The procedure to obtain NLclick,1,γs|Z is analogous. In
particular, one can basically use the same linear program
given by Eq. (43) after replacing “minNclick,0,γs|Z” with “min
Nclick,1,γs|Z”.
To calculate eUph, first we can obtain expressions for error
events which are similar to the ones given by Eq. (42) by
utilizing the fact that 0 ≤ Eerror,n,γj |χ ≤ Nχpjpjn for all n
and j ∈ {s, v,w}, where Eerror,n,γj |χ denotes the expected
number of events where Alice selects the intensity γj and
sends Bob an n-photon pulse, and Bob obtains an error
given that both Alice and Bob select the χ basis. Then we
estimate a lower bound on the number of single-photon click
events in the X basis with intensity γs, which we denote by
NLclick,1,γs|X, as well as an upper bound on the corresponding
number of errors, which we denote by NUerror,1,γs|X. To
obtain NLclick,1,γs|X, we can use the linear program which
has been used to estimate NLclick,1,γs|Z after replacing all
the parameters and variables in the Z basis with those in
the X basis. Similarly, we can also modify the program
for estimating NLclick,1,γs|X to calculate N
U
error,1,γs|X. For
this, we simply replace all the numbers that refer to click
events with those referring to error events. In addition, we
replace “min N1,γs|X” with “min −Nerror,1,γs|X”, which is
equivalent to maximizing Nerror,1,γs|X. Finally, given the
values of NLclick,1,γs|Z, N
L
click,1,γs|X and N
U
error,1,γs|X, we use
random sampling without replacement to estimate eUph. For
this, we use the method employed in [12, 14], which relies on
Serfling’s inequality [41]. We obtain that
eUph =
1
NL
click,1,γs|Z
min
{[
NLclick,1,γs|Z
NUerror,1,γs|X
NL
click,1,γs|X
+
(
NLclick,1,γs|Z +N
L
click,1,γs|X
)
×Υ
(
NLclick,1,γs|Z, N
L
click,1,γs|X, ε
′
)]
, NLclick,1,γs|Z
}
,
(45)
except for error probability
εph,1 ≤ ε′ + εX,1 + εEX,1, (46)
where the function Υ (x, y, z) is defined as Υ (x, y, z) =√
(x+ 1) ln (z−1) / [2y (x+ y)], and εX,1 and εEX,1 are the
error probabilities associated to the estimation of NLclick,1,γs|X
and NUerror,1,γs|X, respectively.
APPENDIX C. QUANTUM SYSTEMS, SYMBOLS, RANDOM
VARIABLES AND SETS
In this section, we summarize all the quantum systems,
symbols, random variables and sets that appear in the main
text in tables V, III.
APPENDIX D. ESTIMATION OF eUph IN THE PRESENCE OF
A THA AGAINST THE IM AND THE PM
First, as what we did in Sec. III 2 in the main text,
for simplicity we focus on the single-photon scenario. For
this, let us consider a single-photon BB84 QKD protocol.
The steps of this protocol can be directly obtained from
those of the decoy-state BB84 protocol defined in Sec. II
in the main text. In particular, this protocol is defined as
follows (where, for simplicity, here we have not included the
parameter estimation, information reconciliation and privacy
amplification steps):
1. The first two steps of the protocol are repeatedN times.
In each round, Alice probabilistically selects a basis
χA ∈ {Z, X} with probabilities pZ and pX = 1 − pZ,
respectively. Then she prepares a single-photon state
in the selected basis and sends it to Bob via a quantum
channel.
2. For each incoming signal, Bob selects a measurement
basis χB ∈ {Z, X} with probabilities pZ and pX =
1 − pZ, respectively. He employs the selected basis to
measure it and takes note if he obtains a click event.
3. Then, Bob announces which events result in a click.
Alice and Bob discard all the data associated to the non-
click events.
4. For each click event, Alice selects the ZAc or XAc basis
with probabilities pZAc and pXAc , respectively (we shall
call this Alice’s coin basis choice), and she announces
her choice.
5. If Alice’s coin basis choice is XAc , Bob declares his
measurement basis choice but Alice does not declare
her state preparation basis choice. Afterwards, they
discard the corresponding system and data. If Alice’s
choice is ZAc , Alice and Bob declare their state
preparation and measurement basis choices. If Alice’s
and Bob’s basis choices disagree, they discard the
corresponding systems and data. If they match, then
Alice and Bob keep the corresponding data.
6. Finally, Alice and Bob announce all the data
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TABLE II. Quantum systems and symbols
Ep Eve’s probe system
Ea Eve’s ancillary system
E′p Back-reflected light from Ep
ρSα,in,χ
Normalized joint state of Alice’s n-photon pulse in the ith trial when she selects an intensity in the subset Sα
and the basis χ and Eve’s systems Ea, E′p
Aq Virtual qubit, which contains Alice’s bit value choice
Ap Alice’s photonic system that she sends to Bob via a quantum channel
Aa Ancillary system in Alice’s hands to account for the loss in her transmitter
Ac Alice’s quantum coin
pZ (pX) Probability for Alice/Bob to choose the Z (X) basis to prepare her state
pZAc (pXAc ) Probability for Alice to choose the fictitious basis Zc (Xc)
N jZ (N
j
X) Predetermined threshold value for the set Ẑ
j (X̂j)
N jZ (N
j
X) Predetermined threshold value for the set Ẑ
j (X̂j)
EsZ Predetermined quantum bit error rate
εsec Secrecy parameter of the protocol
εcor Correctness parameter of the protocol
`′ Length of the final key
N Total number of pulses sent by Alice
pl Probability for Alice to choose the intensity setting l
pln Conditional probability that Alice emits a pulse with n photons given that she chooses the intensity setting l
β Limited amplitude of Eve’s input light
θ Phase of Eve’s input light
βk Amplitude of Eve’s back-reflected light
θk Phase of Eve’s back-reflected light
Imax Upper bound on the intensity of Eve’s back-reflected light
TABLE III. Random variables and sets
χA Alice’s basis choice with χA ∈ {Z,X}
χB Bob’s basis choice with χB ∈ {Z,X}
χ The same basis choice by Alice and Bob
Zc (Xc) Alice’s fictitious basis choice
γj Alice’s intensity setting with j ∈ {s, v,w}
Ẑj (X̂j)
Set of indexes that identifies the click events where Alice chose the Zc basis and the intensity γj and both
Alice and Bob chose the basis Z (X)
Zj (Xj) Post-selected set with |Zj | = N jZ (|Xj | = N jX)
NLclick,0,γs|Z
(NLclick,1,γs|Z)
Lower bound on the number of vacuum (single-photon) events in the sifted key data identified by the set Zs.
eUph Upper bound on the single-photon phase error rate of the sifted key data indexed by Z
s
leakEC Amount of syndrome information revealed by Alice in error correction step
S Alice’s intensity set {γ1, γ2, ...γm}
Sα Subset of S
Din,S1,S2,χ Trace distance between the states ρ
S1,i
n,χ and ρS2,in,χ
Eλ Expected number of times that event ‘λ’ happens
Nλ Actual number of times that event ‘λ’ happens
∆jkχ,n Deviation term between Eclick,n,γj |χ and Eclick,n,γk|χ due to information leakage from the IM
δλ
Deviation term between the expected number and actual number of times that event ‘λ’ happens when using
Azuma’s inequality
ελ (ε̂λ) Error probability when using Azuma’s inequality to estimate a lower (upper) bound on δλ
NLclick,1,γs|X Lower bound on the number of single-photon click events in the X basis with intensity γ
s
NUerror,1,γs|X Upper bound on the of errors of single-photon click events in the X basis with intensity γ
s
Nerror,γj |X
Actual number of errors given that Alice sends Bob a pulse with intensity γj and both Alice and Bob select the
X basis
Nerror,n,γj |X
Actual number of errors given that Alice selects the intensity γj and sends Bob an n-photon pulse and both
Alice and Bob select the X basis
δ′XAc=− Deviation term when using Chernoff bound to estimate NXAc=−
ε′XAc=−
(ε̂′XAc=− )
Error probability when using Chernoff bound to estimate a lower (upper) bound on δ′XAc=−
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corresponding to the case where Alice selected the coin
basis ZAc and Alice selected the X basis to prepare her
state and Bob selects the X basis to measurement it.
As already pointed out in the main text, in the presence of
a THA against the PM, the joint state of the single-photon
states emitted by Alice together with Eve’s back-reflected
light could be basis dependent. To estimate the phase error
rate in this scenario, we use the following fictitious protocol:
1. The first two steps of the protocol are repeatedN times.
In each round, Alice prepares a state of the form:∣∣Ψi〉
Ac,Aq,Ap,Aa,E′p,Ea
=
√
pZ|0〉Ac
∣∣ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E′p,Ea
+
√
pX|1〉Ac
∣∣ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E′p,Ea , (47)
where Ac is the so-called quantum coin. She keeps
the systems Ac, Aq and Aa in a quantum memory, and
sends system Ap to Bob.
2. Bob performs a quantum nondemolition (QND)
measurement on each received signal and takes note
if he obtains a click event. For each click event, Bob
selects the measurement basis between the Z and X
basis with probabilities pZ and pX, respectively.
3. Then Bob announces which events result in a click.
Alice and Bob discard all the systems and data
associated to non-click events.
4. For each click event, Alice selects the ZAc or XAc basis
with probabilities pZAc and pXAc , respectively, and
measures the quantum coin in the selected basis. Note
that when Alice selects the ZAc basis, the result of her
measurement on the quantum coin directly determines
her state preparation basis choice (i.e., ZAc = 0 implies
the Z basis and ZAc = 1 implies the X basis). If her
choice is the XAc basis, then Alice selects the Z or X
basis with probabilities pZ and pX, respectively. Then
she announces her coin basis choice.
5. If Alice’s coin basis choice is XAc , Bob declares his
measurement basis choice but Alice does not declare
her state preparation basis choice. If Alice’s coin
basis choice is ZAc , Alice and Bob declare their state
preparation and measurement basis choices. Moreover,
if Alice’s and Bob’s basis choices disagree, they discard
the corresponding systems and data. If they match, both
Alice and Bob measure their systems in the X basis,
rather than in the original selected basis.
6. Finally, Alice and Bob announce all the data
corresponding to the case where Alice’s ZAc basis
measurement outcome on the quantum coin was ‘1’ and
Bob selected the X basis in step 2. Also, Alice counts
the number of events “XAc = −” in N trials.
Importantly, note that from Eve’s point of view the fictitious
protocol defined above is equivalent to the actual protocol in
the sense that the quantum states and the classical information
interchanged between Alice and Bob are the same in both
protocols.
Then, by applying the Bloch sphere bound in terms of
probabilities [38] to this virtual scenario, one obtains
1− 2Pri (XAc = − |click, sb,X− error,XAc )
≤ 2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1 |click, sb,X− error,ZAc )
×
√
1− Pri (ZAc = 1 |click, sb,X− error,ZAc ),
(48)
1− 2Pri (XAc = − |click, sb,No X− error,XAc )
≤ 2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1 |click, sb,No X− error,ZAc )
×
√
1− Pri (ZAc = 1 |click, sb,No X− error,ZAc ).
(49)
In order to upper bound the phase error rate, our strategy
is first to convert each probability appearing in Eqs. (48)
and (49) into a conditional probability conditioned only on
a click event. Next, we obtain a relationship among all the
conditional probabilities by adding the converted inequalities.
Note that these probabilities are related to the events we
obtain in the trials after step 4 in the fictitious protocol,
and most importantly the number of the trials is fixed to
the number of the click events. Thanks to this, we can
apply Azuma’s inequality and Chernoff bound (note that
these inequalities assume a fixed probability space) to those
conditional probabilities to convert the relationship in terms
of the number.
Let us first convert each probability appearing in Eqs. (43)
and (44) into conditional probabilities conditioned only on the
click event. Due to the fact that the events ‘XAc ’ and ‘ZAc ’
are independent of the events ‘click’ and ‘sb’ and, also, we
have that the event ‘click’ is independent of the event ‘sb’, we
find that
Pri (sb,X− error |click,XAc )
= Pri (sb,X− error |click,ZAc )
= Pri (sb,X− error |click) ,
Pri (sb,No X− error |click,XAc )
= Pri (sb,No X− error |click,ZAc )
= Pri (sb,No X− error |click) .
(50)
By multiplying Eq. (48) by Pri (sb,X− error |click,XAc )
and multiplying Eq. (49) by
Pri (sb,No X− error |click,XAc ) and adding them together,
we obtain
Pri (sb)− Pri (sb) Pri (XAc = − |click,XAc )
≤ 2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1, sb,X− error |click,ZAc )
×
√
Pri (ZAc = 0, sb,X− error |click,ZAc )
+2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1, sb,No X− error |click,ZAc )
×
√
Pri (ZAc = 0, sb,No X− error |click,ZAc ),
(51)
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where we have taken into account that
Pri (sb,X− error |click,XAc )
+Pri (sb,No X− error |click,XAc )
= Pri (sb,X− error |click)
+Pri (sb,No X− error |click)
= Pri (sb |click) = Pri (sb) ,
Pri (XAc = −, sb,X− error |click,XAc )
+Pri (XAc = −, sb,No X− error |click,XAc )
= Pri (XAc = −, sb, |click,XAc )
= Pri (sb, |click,XAc ) Pri (XAc = − |sb, click,XAc )
= Pri (sb, |click) Pri (XAc = − |click,XAc )
= Pri (sb) Pri (XAc = − |click,XAc ) .
(52)
Here, Pri (XAc = − |click,XAc ) is the conditional
probability that the measurement outcome on the quantum
coin is ‘−’ given that Bob obtains a click and Alice
performs the XAc basis measurement on the quantum coin,
and Pri (ZAc = 1, sb,X− error |click,ZAc ) is the joint
conditional probability that the measurement outcome on the
quantum coin is ‘1’, Alice and Bob select the same basis and
there is an X basis error given that Bob obtains a click and
Alice performs the ZAc basis measurement on the quantum
coin. The other joint conditional probabilities are defined
similarly.
Note that
Pri (ZAc = 1, sb,X− error |click,ZAc )
= Pri (sb, |click,ZAc )
×Pri (ZAc = 1,X− error |click,ZAc , sb)
= Pri (sb) Pri (ZAc = 1,X− error |click,ZAc ) ,
(53)
and a similar relation also holds for the other terms in Eq. (51).
This means, in particular, that we can rewrite Eq. (51) as
1− 2Pri (XAc = − |click,XAc )
≤ 2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1,X− error |click,ZAc )
×
√
Pri (ZAc = 0,X− error |click ,ZAc)
+2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1,No X− error |click ,ZAc)
×
√
Pri (ZAc = 0,No X− error |click ,ZAc),
(54)
where we have already canceled the common factor ‘Pri (sb)’
that appears on both sides of Eq. (54).
Then by multiplying both sides of Eq. (54) by
Pri (ZAc |click), we obtain
Pri (ZAc |click)
−Pri (ZAc |click) Pri (XAc = − |click,XAc )
≤ 2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1,X− error,ZAc |click)
×
√
Pri (ZAc = 0,X− error,ZAc |click)
+2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1,No X− error,ZAc |click)
×
√
Pri (ZAc = 0,No X− error,ZAc |click).
(55)
Due to the concavity of the square root function, we take
the sum over i ∈ {1, 2, ..., Nclick} and obtain
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc |click)
−
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc |click) Pri (XAc = − |click,XAc )
≤ 2
√
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 1,X− error,ZAc |click)
×
√
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 0,X− error,ZAc |click)
+2
√
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 1,No X− error,ZAc |click)
×
√
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 0,No X− error,ZAc |click),
(56)
Let us denote the expected values after Nclick trials by
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 1,X− error,ZAc |click)
= EX,X−error,
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 0,X− error,ZAc |click)
= EZ,X−error,
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 1,No X− error,ZAc |click)
= EX,No X−error,
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 0,No X− error,ZAc |click)
= EZ,No X−error.
(57)
Then Eq. (56) can be rewritten as:
pZAcNclick − 2
pZAc
pXAc
EXAc=−
≤ 2√EX,X−errorEZ,X−error
+2
√EX,No X−errorEZ,No X−error, (58)
where we have also used the fact that
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc |click) = pZAc
Nclick∑
i=1
1 = pZAcNclick, (59)
and
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc |click) Pri (XAc = − |click,XAc )
=
Nclick∑
i=1
pZAc
Pri(XAc=−,XAc |click )
Pri(XAc |click )
=
pZAc
pXAc
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (XAc = −,XAc |click)
=
pZAc
pXAc
EXAc=−.
(60)
Importantly, note that EZ,X−error is actually equal to
Ephase error. The quantity EXAc=− denotes the expected
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number of click events where Alice chooses the X basis to
measure the quantum coin and obtains the outcome ‘−’. Since
the number of events that we obtain from the XAc basis
measurement only on the click events can never be larger than
the total number of events that we could have obtained if we
had measured all the N quantum coins along the XAc basis,
in the asymptotic limit we have that
EXAc=− ≤ NpXAcPr (XAc = −|XAc)
≤ 12NpXAc
[
1−min
i
√
pZpX cosφ
i
∣∣〈ΨiZ ∣∣ΨiX〉∣∣] ,
(61)
where for simplicity we denote
Aq,Ap,Aa,E′p,Ea
〈
ΨiZ
∣∣ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E′p,Ea by 〈ΨiZ ∣∣ΨiX〉,
and φi denotes the angle between the states
∣∣ΨiZ〉 and ∣∣ΨiX〉.
Next, we apply Azuma’s inequality [26] to all the terms of
Eq. (58) except for EXAc=−, and we employ Chernoff bound
to EXAc=−. As a result, we obtain the following inequality:
pZAc (Nclick + δclick)− 2
pZAc
pXAc
(NXAc=− + δ
′
XAc=−
)
≤ 2√(NX,X−error + δX,X−error) (NZ,X−error + δZ,X−error)
+2
√(
Nclick|X −NX,X−error + δX,No X−error
)(
Nclick|Z −NZ,X−error + δZ,No X−error
) , (62)
except for an exponentially small error probability (ε′XAc=− +
ε̂′XAc=−) +
∑
λ (ελ + εˆλ), where λ ∈ {(click), (X,X −
error), (Z,X−error), (X,No X−error), (Z,No X−error)}.
In the above equation, Nλ denotes the actual number
of times that the event ‘λ’ occurs. The quantities δλ
denote the deviation terms due to the use of Azuma’s
inequality to estimate Nλ and they are bounded by
δλ ∈ [−∆λ, ∆ˆλ] with the bounds being given by
∆λ = f (Nclick, ελ) and ∆ˆλ = f (Nclick, εˆλ). The
expected number EXAc=− can first be upper bounded by
using Eq. (61) in the asymptotic case. Then we estimate the
actual number NXAc=− by using the Chernoff bound [39],
which guarantees that NXAc=− = EXAc=− + δ′XAc=−
except for an exponentially small error probability
ε′XAc=− + ε̂
′
XAc=−
. The corresponding fluctuation deviation
term δ′XAc=− lies in an interval [−∆′XAc=− , ∆ˆ′XAc=− ] and
the bounds are given by ∆′XAc=− = g(XAc=−, ε
′
XAc=−
)
and ∆̂′XAc=− = ĝ(NXAc=−, ε̂
′
XAc=−
), respectively,
with the functions g(x, y) =
√
2x ln(1/y) and
ĝ(x, y) =
√
3x ln(1/y) [16]. Nclick|Z(X) denotes the
actual number of events where both Alice and Bob
select the Z (X) basis and Bob obtains a click, i.e,
Nclick|Z(X) = NZ(X),X−error +NZ(X),No X−error. Finally,
NZ,X−error is the quantity that we wish to estimate.
So far, the analysis above considers the case where
Alice has a single-photon source at her disposal. To
adapt it to the decoy-state BB84 protocol described
in Sec. II, which is based on the use of WCPs,
is however straightforward. In particular, since the
secret key is only distilled from data associated to the
signal intensity setting, now all the actual numbers that
appear in Eq. (62) refer to the single-photon contributions
within the signal intensity setting. γs. That is, now
Nclick, NX,X−error, NZ,X−error, Nclick|X, Nclick|Z refer to
Nclick,1,γs , NX−error,1,γs|X, NX−error,1,γs|Z, Nclick,1,γs|X
,Nclick,1,γs|Z. One can use the same method based on linear
optimization that we used in the previous sections to estimate
Nclick,1,γs , NX−error,1,γs|X, NX−error,1,γs|Z, Nclick,1,γs|X
,Nclick,1,γs|Z. In so doing, one can estimate an upper bound
on NX−error,1,γs|Z and thus obtain eUph.
APPENDIX E. PARAMETERSDn,{γj},{γk},χ AND
Dn,{γj},{γk,γl},χ
The parameters Dn,{γj},{γk},χ and Dn,{γj},{γk,γl},χ with
j, k, l ∈ {s, v,w} which are needed to estimate NLclick,0,γs|Z,
NLclick,1,γs|Z and e
U
ph have been calculated in Ref. [1]. For
the special case of an individual THA where there is no
quantum correlation between Alice’s and Eve’s systems, i.e.,
ργ
k,i
n,χ = |n〉 〈n|χ ⊗ ργ
k,i
χ for all i and n, where |n〉χ is
a Fock state with n photons prepared in the basis χ, and
ργ
k
χ =
∣∣βkeiθk〉 〈βkeiθk ∣∣ is the state of Eve’s back-reflected
light. In this case, Dn,{γj},{γk},χ and Dn,{γj},{γk,γl},χ do
not depend on χ and Dn,{γj},{γk},χ do not depend on n.
So we shall denote them by D{γj},{γk} and Dn,{γj},{γk,γl},
respectively. For completeness, below we include the values
of these parameters in different cases [1].
A. Case 1
We have that
D{γv},{γs} =
√
1− e2Imax[cos(θv)−1],
D{γw},{γs} =
√
1− e2Imax[cos(θw)−1]. (63)
To calculate the parameters Dn,{γj},{γk,γl}, we have that
Dn,{γj},{γk,γl} =
1
2
∑
i
|λi|, (64)
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where λi are the eigenvalues of a 3× 3 matrix Λ whose
elements are given by
Λa,b = δa,1
〈
βeiθj
∣∣ βeiθb〉− qnklδa,2 〈βeiθk ∣∣ βeiθb〉
− (1− qnkl) δa,3
〈
βeiθl
∣∣ βeiθb〉 ,
(65)
where β =
√
Imax, θ1 = θj , θ2 = θk, θ3 = θl, respectively,
a, b ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and δa,b is the Kronecker delta.
B. Case 2
Here, we have that
D{γv},{γs} =
√
1− e− Imaxγs [γs+γv−2
√
γsγv cos(θv)],
D{γw},{γs} =
√
1− e− Imaxγs [γs+γw−2
√
γsγw cos(θw)].
(66)
And the parameters Dn,{γj},{γk,γl} are given by
Dn,{γj},{γk,γl} =
1
2
∑
i
|λi|, (67)
where λi are the eigenvalues of a 3× 3 matrix Λ whose
elements are given by
Λa,b = δa,1
〈
βje
iθj
∣∣ βbeiθb〉− qnklδa,2 〈βkeiθk ∣∣ βbeiθb〉
− (1− qnkl) δa,3
〈
βle
iθl
∣∣ βbeiθb〉 ,
(68)
where βα =
√
Imaxγα/γs with α ∈ {j, k, l}, θ1 = θj , θ2 =
θk, θ3 = θl, respectively, a, b ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and δa,b is the
Kronecker delta.
C. Case 3
In this case we have that when Imax ≤ log2 and γw ≤
γv ≤ γs, for any Pcut ≥ 1, the parameters Dn,{γj},{γk},χ
and Dn,{γj},{γk,γl},χ have the form:
D{γv},{γs} ≤ 12 − e
−Imax
2
Pcut∑
n=0
Inmax
n!
[
1−
∣∣∣1− eImax(1−γv/γs)(γvγs )n∣∣∣],
D{γw},{γs} ≤ 12 − e
−Imax
2
Pcut∑
n=0
Inmax
n!
[
1−
∣∣∣1− eImax(1−γw/γs)(γwγs )n∣∣∣],
Dn,{γs},{γv,γw} ≤ 12
{
1−
Pcut∑
n=0
e−Imax Imaxnn!
[
1− ∣∣1− qnvweImax(1−γv/γs)
×
(
γv
γs
)n
− (1− qnvw) eImax(1−γw/γs)
(
γw
γs
)n∣∣∣]} ,
Dn,{γv},{γs,γw} ≤ 12
{
qnsw + (1− qnsw) eImax −
Pcut∑
n=0
e−Imax Imaxnn!
[
qnsw + (1− qnsw) eImax
−
∣∣∣eImax(1−γv/γs)(γvγs )n − qnsw − (1− qnsw) eImax(1−γw/γs)(γwγs )n∣∣∣]} ,
Dn,{γw},{γs,γv} ≤ 12
{
qnsv + (1− qnsv) eImax −
Pcut∑
n=0
e−Imax Imaxnn!
[
qnsv + (1− qnsv) eImax
−
∣∣∣eImax(1−γw/γs)(γwγs )n − qnsv − (1− qnsv) eImax(1−γv/γs)(γvγs )n∣∣∣]} .
(69)
APPENDIX F. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE SECRET
KEY RATE RATIO
To further illustrate the effect that the information leakage
has on the secret key rate as a function of the finite number
of transmitted pulses, in Fig. 5 we plot the ratio between
the secret key rates for two fixed values of information
leakage, Imax = {10−7, 10−12} and when Imax = 0 (i.e.,
when there is no information leakage). Here we consider
the scenario analyzed in Case 1 in the main text and, for
simplicity, we disregard the information leakage from the PM.
The simulation results for the other two cases are analogous.
In particular, we see that when Imax is as small as 10−12, this
ratio is always very close to one at all achievable distances
independently of the value of N . This means that the effect
of information leakage can be basically neglected. However,
when the amount of information leakage increases to Imax =
10−7, then the ratio is considerably less than one and drops
quicker as the distance increases. In addition, our simulation
results seem to indicate that for a fixed value of Imax (say
Imax = 10
−7) and for a fixed distance, the smaller the value
of N is, the lower the key rate ratio is. That is, the effect of
information leakage increases whenN decreases, as expected.
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